The United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) receives more applications today than it ever has before. What happens to those applications? Patent prosecutors all have stories and personal experiences. Until quite recently, however, this sort of “anecdata” was all that was available, because the law prevented anyone from ever finding out what happened to patent applications that did not ultimately issue as patents. Continued…

Nearly half of litigated patents are invalidated. To address this issue and reduce the number of “bad patents,” commentators and industry members have called for reforms to increase certainty in the patent system. Many have also proposed reforms that meet the varied needs of different industries. This paper responds to these prior proposals and proposes reforms that harness information known to patentees. These reforms are designed to meet industry-specific needs, as exemplified by the pharmaceutical and computer industries. Continued…

It has become increasingly common for brain images to be proffered as evidence in civil and criminal litigation. This Article offers some general guidelines to legal thinkers about how to understand brain imaging studies—or at least avoid misunderstanding them. And it annotates a published brain imaging study by several of the present authors (and others) in order to illustrate and explain, with step-by-step commentary.

Last fall, I presented a paper at a conference on neuroimaging and the law looking at the way jurors were likely to construe neuroimaging evidence in insanity defense cases. I tried to balance jurors’ likely positive response to the perceived characteristics of this evidence—vivid, objective, quantifiable, advanced—with their likely negative response to the use of this evidence in such cases (reflecting their prejudice, hostility, and hatred toward insanity pleaders)—and concluded that I was “not at all sure that the pizzazz of neuroimaging testimony—not withstanding its colorfulness and its propensity to reductionism—will trump these deep-seated attitudes.” In short, I sought to make the point that the science of neuroscience has to be assessed in the sociopolitical context of the specific question of law that is central to the specific case before the court. Continued…

In exchange for granting inventors a limited monopoly, the patent laws require inventors to “enable” the public to make and use their invention. In Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., Automotive Technologies International, Inc. v. BMW of North America, Inc., and Sitrick v. Dreamworks, L.L.C., the Federal Circuit made it far easier to show that patents are invalid based on lack of enablement in the predictable arts. These decisions rely on the enablement doctrine to invalidate claims that appear to be far broader in scope than what the written description of the patents suggests. Continued…

Copyright is a system of federal regulation that empowers private actors to silence others, yet no one seriously doubts that copyright is consistent in principle with the First Amendment freedom of speech. Scholars and courts have tried to resolve the tension between exclusive rights in expression and free speech in one of two ways: some appeal to copyright’s built-in accommodations to suppress any independent First Amendment analysis, while others apply standard First Amendment tests to evaluate whether and where copyright becomes an unconstitutional burden on speech. Neither of these approaches properly appreciates the constitutional balance struck at the Framing between the Copyright Clause and the First Amendment. This Article develops a free speech theory of copyright informed by this balance. I advocate thinking of the Copyright Clause’s limits as free speech limits, giving them the force of an individual right. Continued…