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   <title>Stanford Technology Law Review</title>
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   <id>tag:stlr.stanford.edu,2008://1</id>
   <updated>2008-02-03T05:12:23Z</updated>
   
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<entry>
   <title>Taking the &quot;Long View&quot; on the Fourth Amendment: Stored Records and the Sanctity of the Home</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://stlr.stanford.edu/2008/02/taking_the_long_view_on_the_fo.html" />
   <id>tag:stlr.stanford.edu,2007://1.21</id>
   
   <published>2008-02-02T00:22:09Z</published>
   <updated>2008-02-03T05:12:23Z</updated>
   
   <summary>In the wake of the California energy crisis of 2000-2001, the California Energy Commission (CEC) and California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) are aggressively pursuing “demand response” (DR) energy programs aimed at reducing peak energy demand. Demand response systems convey information...</summary>
   <author>
      <name>Henry Lien</name>
      
   </author>
         <category term="2007 Symposium" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
         <category term="Symposium Articles" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
   
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://stlr.stanford.edu/">
      In the wake of the California energy crisis of 2000-2001, the California Energy Commission (CEC) and California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) are aggressively pursuing “demand response” (DR) energy programs aimed at reducing peak energy demand. Demand response systems convey information about market conditions through pricing or reliability signals to customers, who in turn, hopefully, alter their electricity consumption choices. In particular DR programs are aimed at shifting the time at which customers use energy through the implementation of time-varying tariffs. Armed with information about the time-varying cost of electricity residential and commercial customers are expected to reduce energy usage and/or shift their usage to non-peak, less costly, hours. Such shifts, even absent reductions in overall consumption, will reduce the likelihood of energy brown and black outs and provide direct savings to consumers. Technologies to enable the demand response system, including  advanced metering research and development [OpenAMI] and sensor and control technologies development [DRETD], are under development. These technologies will be coupled with a
communication and network infrastructure that supports the multicast of real-time pricing information, and the aggregation of energy usage and billing information.

      <![CDATA[Demand response energy infrastructure is a policy imperative. The federal Energy Policy Act of 2005 directs the Department of Energy to identify target levels of demand response benefits that can be achieved by January of 2007. The statute directs electric utilities to begin offering time-varying energy rates, and meters capable of supporting those rates, to consumers within 18 months of August 8, 2005. The Department of Energy is charged with educating consumers about the benefits of the systems; both state and federal agencies are charged with investigating the potential of, and making plans for, demand response adoption. It is expected that various demand response programs will be adopted throughout the country. Similar infrastructures are being put in place in other countries, some more advanced than in the U.S.

A core component of the demand response system is the collection of information about energy consumption from residential and commercial buildings at frequent intervals. The analog electric meters prevalent today are unsophisticated instruments that allow a meter reader to assess electricity use during the time interval between meter readings. The meters found in basements and on exterior walls, are typically read once a month by an employee of the utility who visits on foot.

Over the next two to five years these meters will be replaced by digital meters that collect data at frequent intervals, store it for many days, and transmit it wirelessly to the utility. Meters likely to be installed during 2006 are expected to contain a data collection module that will enable hourly readings and wireless transmittal of these readings to the utilities. Advanced metering installations projected to begin in 2007 will be capable of greater internal processing and have enhanced data storage capability. These meters are expected to collect data on electricity consumption at intervals ranging from one hour down to fifteen minutes. There is little agreement on how often meter readings will be sent to the utility or the intermediate nodes (concentrators) within the neighborhood, and the period for which readings will be retained in the meter, the nodes or the utility. The meters will collect and send a data set including a unique meter identifier, timestamp, usage data and some form of time synchronization information. The data is expected to be in a proprietary format unique to the individual manufacturer or utility, although some participants are looking forward to the availability of open standards and
architecture for meters.

Current utility practices include saving many years worth of customer usage data to facilitate customer dispute resolution as well as load and other research. These data retention practices are expected to persist. If all the readings are maintained, a customer’s yearly record will shift from a record of one data point per month reflecting average daily usage to a record of 750- 3000 distinct and time-stamped data points per month that reflect actual energy use. The information itself is distinct from the averages found in today’s bills. More significantly, the information one can glean or infer from this more accurate and detailed data set is radically different. Electricity consumption patterns in the coming DR system will reveal variations in power consumption that in turn can be associated with various household activities. Over time, power consumption can reveal personal sleep and work habits, the presence of certain medical equipment and other specialized devices, and of course signal the illegal behavior which today prompts law enforcement to seek them in certain drug production cases.

The changes in the frequency, format, contents, storage and transmission of data about electricity consumption that are integral to the planned demand response infrastructure raise interesting questions about the ongoing viability of maintaining, as a technical, practical and legal matter, the privacy of activities occurring within the home. How will the system architecture and business models address the increased sensitivity of meter readings? For example, imagine a future “wardriving” incident where wardrivers detect and monitor the unencrypted traffic between household meters and neighborhood level concentrators that relay energy usage information to the utilities. Monitoring such communications could provide information about occupancy on a per house, block, or neighborhood level. Armed with such information a criminal could relatively easily assess the best time to burglarize homes or engage in other property crimes in a neighborhood. How will the business models of utilities evolve to take advantage of the more detailed information that can be gleaned from energy consumption data taken at fifteen-minute intervals? Most significantly for the purposes of this paper, how will the increased information about in-home activities generated, transmitted and stored in DR systems be dealt with under the Fourth Amendment? 

Existing legal precedent addressing the privacy of in-home activities, the energy they require, and the heat signatures they emit point in different directions. On the one hand the Supreme Court relatively recently affirmed the primacy of privacy in the home by prohibiting the use of a thermal imager to gather details about the home previously inaccessible without a physical trespass—at least until such time as the technology to do so becomes widely available to the general public. On the other hand, the Court has an entrenched position that where the government obtains personal details from third-party business records the Fourth Amendment is not implicated. In the first instance the Court has resisted limitations on Fourth Amendment protections for the home premised on the quality or quantity of the data that can be known. In contrast, the quality and quantity of the data in third party records clearly animates the existing Fourth Amendment case law finding no protection for personal details found in business records and has played a strong role in State Court decisions about the privacy protections provided by Fourth Amendment corollaries in state constitutions. While eschewing an examination of the
quality and quantity of information that devices reveal about the inside of the home, the Supreme Court has allowed the location of that information—in business records—to be completely determinative of the scope of Fourth Amendment protection.

Under the Court’s jurisprudence it is quite plausible that information about energy consumption inside the home contained in the records of a public utility—regardless of how sophisticated and detailed it becomes or how much it can reveal about the residents—will be found unprotected by the Fourth Amendment while the use of a relatively unsophisticated “device” that enhances law enforcement officers’ senses, allowing them to retrieve far less detailed information about in-home energy consumption, will require a warrant. At least until these devices become widely available to the public—as we would suggest they are today.

We are interested in exploring the Court’s divergent Fourth Amendment analyses when considering technological advancements that directly enhance the ability of law enforcement to gather information, and data collection and retention advancements in the private sector that similarly enhance the ability of law enforcement to gather information. In the leading case examining the law enforcement use of a thermal imager to gather information about the heat signatures of a home the Court refused to consider the privacy issues about the “waste heat” emanating from the home as driven by the notions of voluntarily disclosure, assumption of the risk, or abandonment. These concepts are the animating force behind the business records decisions. But as a logical matter these concepts are a far better fit for the “waste heat” which is freely available for anyone with the right technology to “see” from a public vantage point then they are for the utility records that are a necessary derivative of heating a home and are provided solely to the utility for the purpose of that service.

As more and more information about individuals’ activities is collected and archived by the private sector the Court’s disparate approach to considering the Fourth Amendment implications of direct collection of information by the government versus indirect collection from private sector entities (even where the data collection may be mandated by law) forces us to confront the possibility of a world with virtually no constitutional protection constraining government prying into citizen’s private acts whenever those acts are recorded or can be inferred from data collected in the private sector. If details of individuals’ in-home activities are directly recorded in or easily inferred from business records does the Fourth Amendment simply have nothing to say about the governments access and use of this information? Given that individuals are increasingly dependent on businesses to help them continually and in real-time manage activities and events in the home including the television they view, the nanny they hired, and the energy they use, will there be any private activities that remain outside the Fourth
Amendment free-zone created by the business records case law? This article considers the Fourth Amendment issues raised by the changes in the quantity and quality of the data that soon will be routinely available in utility records in California and eventually across the nation. We begin our exploration of these questions in Part II by exploring the Court’s Fourth Amendment analysis of law enforcement use of technologies that directly enhance their senses. We compare and contrast this with the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment analysis and state courts’ analysis of comparable state constitutional privacy protections in the context of business records that yield information similar to that available through technological devices. We consider the Kyllo, Smith and Miller cases and state constitutional decisions considering
the privacy expectations in utility records. The comparisons highlight the inability of the Supreme Court’s current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to provide a rational and satisfying description of the privacy interests the constitution protects in a world of networks, devices, and personal services that by design collect and retain personal information on private acts. They also illustrate the flimsy protection likely found in the Kyllo cases narrow limitation on “government-only” technology.

As the information in utility records becomes more detailed the Court’s disparate analysis of these two techniques for collecting information about activities taking place in the home leads to increasingly unsatisfying results from a normative perspective. The continued conclusion that personal information contained in third party business records is outside the Fourth Amendment is poised to obliterate the “firm line [the Fourth Amendment draws] at the entrance to the house." We provide details of the DR architecture in Section III and explore the ramifications of the business records case law in this context in Section IV.

In Part V, we conclude that the economics of information processing are changing in a manner that is shifting the scope and effect of the Court’s business records doctrine. Technology that makes it cheaper and easier to collect and maintain information about customers, aligned with a service economy aimed at assisting individuals in managing their every need, activity and interaction, are diminishing the need for law enforcement to engage in the gumshoe surveillance activities of yesteryear or even the high-tech surveillance activities of yesterday. The private sector is subsidizing, at times displacing, the activities of law enforcement (and intelligence). The ability of law enforcement to cheaply and relatively easily access detailed profiles of individual household energy consumption or individual cell phone users’ locations, or access and combine billions of records from a multitude of private sector sources containing personal information as was planned in the Total Information Assessment project will make the Fourth Amendment less and less useful as a tool for prescribing limits on what the government can know and in what circumstances about its citizens.

The evolution of the DR architecture provides a particularly stark example of the capacity of the business records case law to erode the core of Fourth Amendment protections. The cultural dependence on private sector services that generate records containing personal information about activities occurring within the home are blurring the “firm line” around the home that the founders sought to protect. But it is just one example in a growing list. The Court’s disjointed approach to dataveillance and surveillance cannot sustain the privacy of the home as the framers’ or the current court envisioned it. By placing personal information contained in business records outside the scope of Fourth Amendment protection the Supreme Court has consigned us to a future without privacy.

<b>[NOTE: Footnotes in this abstract were omitted.  The full abstract with footnotes can be found in PDF form <a href="http://stlr.stanford.edu/pdf/Mulligan-Lerner-abstract.pdf">here</a>]</b>]]>
   </content>
</entry>
<entry>
   <title>The Olmsteadian Seizure Clause: The Fourth Amendment and the Seizure of Intangible Property</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://stlr.stanford.edu/2008/01/the_olmsteadian_seizure_clause.html" />
   <id>tag:stlr.stanford.edu,2007://1.17</id>
   
   <published>2008-01-28T17:42:00Z</published>
   <updated>2008-01-29T00:12:32Z</updated>
   
   <summary>The Fourth Amendment&apos;s Seizure clause is mired in the Eighteenth century. Its counterpart, the Search clause, has evolved through a steady progression of Supreme Court cases from Katz to Berger to Kyllo, no longer to be confined to the property-based...</summary>
   <author>
      <name>Henry Lien</name>
      
   </author>
         <category term="2007 Symposium" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
         <category term="Symposium Articles" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
   
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://stlr.stanford.edu/">
      The Fourth Amendment&apos;s Seizure clause is mired in the Eighteenth century. Its
counterpart, the Search clause, has evolved through a steady progression of Supreme
Court cases from Katz to Berger to Kyllo, no longer to be confined to the property-based
notions of privacy embodied in Olmstead v. United States. Instead it is sensitive to
modern privacy concerns by extending Constitutional protection to situations that satisfy
the reasonable expectation of privacy test. While imperfect, the evolved Search clause
has kept the protections of the Fourth Amendment relevant in an age of digital evidence,
ubiquitous communication networks, and increasingly sophisticated and invasive
surveillance capabilities.
      <![CDATA[In contrast, the Seizure clause is in an Olmsteadian holding pattern, consistently
interpreted to protect only physical property rights and to regulate only the deprivation of
tangible things. In particular, Courts interpreting the clause rarely consider what
"deprivation" means when we are talking about intangible property such as digital
evidence, and voice and data communications.

In this essay, Professor Ohm argues for a Twenty-First century definition of
Constitutionally-proscribed property deprivation. He argues that a Constitutionally
significant "Seizure" occurs whenever the State obtains the original or a copy of
personally-owned, non-public data. By copying the data, the State deprives the owner of
the property of the ability to delete or alter the State-possessed copy of the data. In
addition, modern Intellectual Property rules, and in particular Copyright, acknowledge
other harms caused by an unauthorized copy.

The Supreme Court has already opened the door to this definition, in Berger and Katz, by
holding in no uncertain terms that voice conversations are both searched and seized when
recorded by the police. Professor Ohm traces lower-court cases that came before and after
Berger and Katz and recognizes that most lower courts have ignored these Supreme
Court's Seizure holdings.

Embracing a modern interpretation of the Seizure clause is consistent with the Framers'
intent, because copying affects the property rights of owners of intangible property in
many of the same ways that physical dispossession deprived property owners at the time
the Fourth Amendment was adopted.

Reconceiving the seizure clause in light of modern concerns about intangible property
rights helps solve many vexing Fourth Amendment puzzles that arise if the sole test is the
reasonable expectation of privacy. For example, does a bit-by-bit copy of a computer's
hard drive implicate the Fourth Amendment, if the human operator does not "view" the
contents as they are copied? Could the government lawfully capture all of the
communications traversing a network without a warrant so long as they did not look at
the contents without a subsequent warrant? Do government-run network intrusion
detection systems implicate the Fourth Amendment?

Viewed as possible violations of the Search clause, these are frustrating, metaphysical
inquiries; if a bit falls in a packet sniffer, has it been searched? In contrast, under the new
definition of Seizure, these questions result in straightforward answers. In every one of
these situations, a seizure has occurred. The owner of the information has lost the ability
to delete, modify, secrete, or contextualize a copy of the information, even though he may
have retained his own copy. No less than when the police commandeer an automobile or
grab a box of records, the owner of the intangible property has lost dominion and control
over his property. A seizure has occurred, and the Fourth Amendment should proscribe
these acts absent warrant or exception.

Audio from Paul Ohm's presentation of his paper at the 2007 STLR Symposium can be accessed <a href="http://voirdire.stanford.edu/student-orgs/stlr/20070126_STLR_Ohm-28k.mp4">here</a>]]>
   </content>
</entry>
<entry>
   <title>Rights Chipped Away: RFID and Identification Documents</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://stlr.stanford.edu/2008/01/rfid_technology.html" />
   <id>tag:stlr.stanford.edu,2007://1.19</id>
   
   <published>2008-01-25T17:45:07Z</published>
   <updated>2008-01-25T20:30:33Z</updated>
   
   <summary>The ACLU of Northern California has been a leader in generating public and legislative attention to the privacy, personal safety, and financial security risks associated with the use of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology in government-issued identification documents, such as...</summary>
   <author>
      <name>Henry Lien</name>
      
   </author>
         <category term="2007 Symposium" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
         <category term="Symposium Articles" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
         <category term="Working Papers" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
   
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://stlr.stanford.edu/">
      The ACLU of Northern California has been a leader in generating public and legislative
attention to the privacy, personal safety, and financial security risks associated with the
use of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology in government-issued
identification documents, such as drivers&apos; licenses and student ID cards.
      <![CDATA[This policy paper will discuss RFID technology, its vulnerabilities, and its impact on civil
liberties and consumer privacy. It will also discuss the development and current status of
RFID legislation that is moving though the California legislature and serving as a model
for other state action.

Audio from Nicole Ozer's presentation of his paper at the 2007 STLR Symposium can be accessed <a href="http://voirdire.stanford.edu/student-orgs/stlr/20070126_STLR_Ozer-28k.mp4">here</a>]]>
   </content>
</entry>
<entry>
   <title>First Principles of Communications Privacy</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://stlr.stanford.edu/2007/06/a_first_principles_approach_to.html" />
   <id>tag:stlr.stanford.edu,2007://1.15</id>
   
   <published>2007-06-18T22:06:00Z</published>
   <updated>2007-06-19T06:07:07Z</updated>
   
   <summary>Under current Fourth Amendment doctrine, parties to a communication enjoy constitutional protection against government surveillance only when they have a reasonable expectation of privacy in those communications. This paper discusses the insufficiency of the reasonable expectation of privacy test in...</summary>
   <author>
      <name>Henry Lien</name>
      
   </author>
         <category term="2007 Symposium" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
         <category term="Symposium Articles" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
   
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://stlr.stanford.edu/">
      Under current Fourth Amendment doctrine, parties to a communication enjoy
constitutional protection against government surveillance only when they have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in those communications. This paper discusses the
insufficiency of the reasonable expectation of privacy test in the context of modern
communications. Significantly, courts have required that communications media be
virtually invulnerable before affording them Fourth Amendment protection.

      <![CDATA[That approach not only misses the point of the Katz case, which established the
reasonable expectations of privacy test, but also dramatically under protects privacy, with
pernicious results. This paper articulates a first principles approach to constitutional
protection that focuses on the reasons electronic surveillance requires significant judicial
oversight. In particular, it argues that electronic surveillance that is intrusive, continuous,
indiscriminate, and hidden should be subject to the heightened procedural requirements
imposed on government wiretappers. Because much of modern online surveillance shares
those characteristics, it should be subject to the highest level of constitutional regulation.

Audio from Susan Freiwald's presentation of her paper at the 2007 STLR Symposiusm can be accessed <a href="http://voirdire.stanford.edu/student-orgs/stlr/20070126_STLR_Freiwald-28k.mp4">here</a>]]>
   </content>
</entry>
<entry>
   <title>The Patentability of Enantiomers: Implications for the Pharmaceutical Industry</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://stlr.stanford.edu/2007/02/the_patentability_of_enantiome.html" />
   <id>tag:stlr.stanford.edu,2007://1.27</id>
   
   <published>2007-02-27T03:19:43Z</published>
   <updated>2007-04-05T20:02:39Z</updated>
   
   <summary>Pharmaceutical sales constitute a $600-billion-per-year global industry. Less well-known is that more than half of the drugs listed in the U.S. Pharmacopoeia contain a class of compounds known as chiral molecules as the active pharmaceutical ingredient. Chiral molecules have special...</summary>
   <author>
      <name>Steve Sha</name>
      
   </author>
         <category term="Feature Articles" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
   
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://stlr.stanford.edu/">
      Pharmaceutical sales constitute a $600-billion-per-year global industry.  Less well-known is that more than half of the drugs listed in the U.S. Pharmacopoeia contain a class of compounds known as chiral molecules as the active pharmaceutical ingredient.  Chiral molecules have special chemical and pharmacological properties that raise questions as to their patentability.  When chiral molecules are synthesized in the laboratory, two distinct mirror-image molecules are formed called “enantiomers.”  Although each enantiomer may have different levels of therapeutic activity and toxicity, technical challenges to separating the enantiomers caused most early chiral drugs to be sold as mixtures of the two molecules, or racemic mixtures.  
      As patents on these racemic mixtures expire and separation techniques improve, drugs formerly sold as racemic mixtures are now being marketed as single-enantiomer versions.  For example, Nexium® is the single-enantiomer version of Prilosec,® and Clarinex® is the single-enantiomer version of Claritin®.  In fact, all five of the top-selling drugs in the world are single-enantiomer drugs, generating total revenues of $35 billion per year.  Switching from a racemic mixture to an enantiomer – called a “racemic switch” in industry parlance – can potentially allow a company to extend product life by securing a patent for an additional twenty years of protection.  Whether the disclosure of the racemate in the prior art renders obvious (and thus unpatentable) each individual enantiomer is therefore a timely and important question.  This article provides an overview of chiral drugs in the pharmaceutical industry, reviews early case law on the patentability of enantiomers, and addresses the patentability of single-enantiomer drugs in the context of modern chemical obviousness jurisprudence.  
   </content>
</entry>
<entry>
   <title>The Spectrum Commons in Theory and Practice</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://stlr.stanford.edu/2007/02/the_spectrum_commons_in_theory.html" />
   <id>tag:stlr.stanford.edu,2007://1.25</id>
   
   <published>2007-02-10T19:06:13Z</published>
   <updated>2007-04-05T20:01:13Z</updated>
   
   <summary>The radio spectrum is a scarce resource that has been historically allocated through command-and-control regulation. Today, it is widely accepted that this type of allocation is as inefficient for spectrum as it would be for paper or land. Many commentators...</summary>
   <author>
      <name>Steve Sha</name>
      
   </author>
         <category term="Feature Articles" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
   
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://stlr.stanford.edu/">
      The radio spectrum is a scarce resource that has been historically allocated through command-and-control regulation. Today, it is widely accepted that this type of allocation is as inefficient for spectrum as it would be for paper or land. Many commentators and scholars, most famously Ronald Coase, have advocated that a more efficient allocation would be achieved if government sold the rights to the spectrum and allowed a free market in radio property to develop.

      A new school of scholars, however, has begun to challenge the spectrum property model. While they agree with Coase that command-and-control spectrum management is highly inefficient, they instead propose to make spectrum a commons. They claim that new spectrum sharing technologies allow a virtually unlimited number of persons to use the same spectrum without causing each other interference and that this eliminates the need for either property rights in, or government control of, spectrum.

This Article aims to show that, despite the rhetoric, the commons model that has been proposed in the legal literature is not an alternative to command-and-control regulation, but in fact shares many of the same inefficiencies of that system. In order for a commons to be viable, someone must control the resource and set orderly sharing rules to govern its use. If the government is the controller of a commons—as proponents of a spectrum commons suggest it should be—then in allocating and managing the commons the government will very likely employ its existing inefficient processes. 

Recently the FCC designated a 50 MHz block of spectrum in the 3650 MHz band as a commons. This Article looks at that proceeding and finds that in creating a commons, the government has not escaped the inefficiencies of command-and-control regulation.   
   </content>
</entry>
<entry>
   <title>Anticipatory Electronic Surveillance in Anglo-American Law</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://stlr.stanford.edu/2007/01/anticipatory_electronic_survei.html" />
   <id>tag:stlr.stanford.edu,2007://1.23</id>
   
   <published>2007-01-23T23:20:38Z</published>
   <updated>2007-01-23T23:25:51Z</updated>
   
   <summary>The principles behind the Fourth Amendment&apos;s Search and Seizure clause are found throughout Anglo-American jurisprudence. This body of law reflects a history of attempting to harmonize the seemingly conflicting governmental goals of communication privacy on the one hand, and protecting...</summary>
   <author>
      <name>Henry Lien</name>
      
   </author>
         <category term="2007 Symposium" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
         <category term="Symposium Articles" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
   
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://stlr.stanford.edu/">
      The principles behind the Fourth Amendment&apos;s Search and Seizure clause are found throughout Anglo-American jurisprudence. This body of law reflects a history of attempting to harmonize the seemingly conflicting governmental goals of communication privacy on the one hand, and protecting the public safety and national security on the other. Nations adopt surveillance doctrines, driven largely by the realities of the technology. As technologies change, assumptions behind doctrines can become outdated. 

      Digitalization of voice and data communications is a watershed moment in technological change that requires a refinement and better definition of core concepts behind surveillance law. A doctrine common in the laws of the United States, United Kingdom, Ireland, Australia and New Zealand, for example, is that copying communications stored in a location at a moment in time is generally viewed less intrusive on the privacy of the target than is the ongoing “interception” of communications over time that transit that location. Accordingly, these nations have adopted legal constructs that differentiate based on the means of communications collection. Under these laws, government agencies generally place greater limits on surveillance that constitutes interception of communications than “mere” collection of stored communications. 
The digitalization of communications, however, necessarily means that all such communications are in some sense in a “stored” state at various and numerous points along the communications path. Voice and electronic communications alike now travel across digital networks, at times resting, if only for a nanosecond, in static memory. This technological change, often referred to as store-and-forward, has profound implications for search and seizure law. If the degree of legal protection of a communication rests solely on whether it was collected while in a stored state, then the law can be easily (and even inadvertently) gamed simply by choice of surveillance technology. An eavesdropper can avoid the more onerous requirement and limits of intercept law by placing a data-capture device at a point in the transmission path where communications come to rest momentarily before continuing to the destination. The device, laying in wait to grab communications during those fleeting moments of storage, will achieve the same end as would a similar device that captures data in motion, but without the need to honor the legal protections regulating an interception. 
Behind the stored-versus-intercept doctrine is the recognition that constant, ongoing and inevitable surveillance of a space more profoundly intrudes upon privacy than searching that same space at a discrete moment in time for evidence that happens to be there at the moment of the search. Defining the precise contours of when the acquisition of a communication is deemed an intercept and when it is not should not turn on its storage state or its location. Rather, the focus should more closely reflect the rationale that there is a greater privacy invasion when one sits in the transmission path, monitoring all that passes in an ongoing surveillance effort. In this model, there is an intercept when communications are collected by a device monitoring, in an ongoing, prospective manner, communications that flow into the space. On the other hand, historical collection, collecting only the data that reside in the space at the precise moment of the search does not constitute an interception. 
As the courts and legislatures in the Anglo-American countries adjust to this profound technological change, there may be a temptation to move to another rule. For example, one could define an intercept to mean the acquisition of a communication anytime before it reaches the location from which it can be collected by the intended recipient, regardless of the means by which the communication is collected. The rule could be that there is an interception of email, for instance, if the email is copied anytime before it reaches the inbox. This, however, misdirects attention to the space from which the data were acquired and diverts the focus from whether intrusive means were used to collect the data. Under that rule, if one deployed a device that constantly monitored an inbox and copied any new incoming messages, there would be no intercept merely because the data were in a particular space. Looking to the ongoing, forward-looking nature of the acquisition provides a more rational and crafted test suited to better protect the underlying privacy interest. 

[The statements expressed herein should not be taken as a position or endorsement of Yahoo! Inc. or its subsidiaries and may not reflect the opinion of their affiliates, joint ventures or partners.]
   </content>
</entry>
<entry>
   <title>Regulating Access to Databases Through Antitrust Law</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://stlr.stanford.edu/2006/11/regulating_access_to_databases.html" />
   <id>tag:www.stanford.edu,2006:/group/stlr/blog//1.6</id>
   
   <published>2006-11-06T20:40:47Z</published>
   <updated>2006-12-06T22:43:59Z</updated>
   
   <summary>It is largely uncontroversial that the &quot;creative&quot; effort in a database will be protected by copyright. However, any effort to extend protection to purely factual databases creates difficulties in determining the proper method and scope of protection. This Paper argues...</summary>
   <author>
      <name>Henry Lien</name>
      
   </author>
         <category term="Feature Articles" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
   
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://stlr.stanford.edu/">
      It is largely uncontroversial that the &quot;creative&quot; effort in a database will be protected by copyright. However, any effort to extend protection to purely factual databases creates difficulties in determining the proper method and scope of protection. This Paper argues that antitrust law can be used to supplement intellectual property law in maintaining the &quot;access-incentive&quot; balance with respect to databases. It starts from the premise that a trend toward &quot;TRIPs-plus&quot; rights in databases, whatever its form, is inevitable. The reason is a simple, but compelling one: business needs shape the law. Various means of database access regulation are explored and contrasted with antitrust law. This Paper concludes that antitrust offers an alternative that more accurately reflects commercial expectations. However, regulators need to be aware of the limitations of applying antitrust law to a regime delicately tuned with pre-existing endogenous checks as well as the effects of their application on innovation by those spurred on the assurance of monopoly profits. In this regard, antitrust law must prove itself to be capable of sophisticated regulation if its interference in the database industry is to be justified.
      <![CDATA[STLR is proud to present: <a href="http://stlr.stanford.edu/STLR/Articles/06_STLR_7/lim-antitrust.pdf">Regulating Access to Databases Through Antitrust Law: A Missing Perspective in the Database Debate</a>, by Daryl Lim Tze Wei. ]]>
   </content>
</entry>
<entry>
   <title>The Search Engine Economy&apos;s Achilles Heel?</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://stlr.stanford.edu/2006/10/the_search_engine_economys_ach.html" />
   <id>tag:www.stanford.edu,2006:/group/stlr/blog//1.7</id>
   
   <published>2006-10-06T20:42:22Z</published>
   <updated>2006-12-09T01:54:03Z</updated>
   
   <summary>In today&apos;s Internet economy, search engines play an increasingly important role in helping consumers locate goods and services. However, search engines may also allow unauthorized online retailers to misuse trademarks as keywords and metatags in ways that can boost their...</summary>
   <author>
      <name>Henry Lien</name>
      
   </author>
         <category term="Feature Articles" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
   
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://stlr.stanford.edu/">
      In today&apos;s Internet economy, search engines play an increasingly important role in helping consumers locate goods and services.  However, search engines may also allow unauthorized online retailers to misuse trademarks as keywords and metatags in ways that can boost their placement in search engine results and increase online sales. For instance, a person other than a trademark holder may purchase a trademarked word or phrase as a search engine keyword (keyword misuse), or may insert them as hidden HTML code on webpages (metatag misuse). Where a website that misuses trademarks in this manner then offers the trademarked goods or services for sale online without a license from the original producer, consumers may be deceived as to the source of those goods and services, and the value of the trademark might be diminished.

      <![CDATA[This article proposes that the international trademark law regime, specifically TRIPs, should be revised to prevent keyword and metatag misuse where it is likely to result in unlicensed Internet sales. It suggests that the Internet should be treated like any other market for goods, albeit one that is inherently global.  Thus, unlicensed Internet sales should be considered parallel imports and proscribed just as unlicensed sales would be in any other geographical territory.  It then explores the international trade implications of proscribing these â€œgray marketâ€ sales under TRIPs rather than domestic (E.U. or U.S.) trademark law or transnational law.  Finally, this article provides an economic justification for the proposed change based on the â€œBottom of the Pyramidâ€ (BOP) model, and illustrates its positive effects on global welfare, particularly in developing nations.

STLR is proud to present: <a href="http://stlr.stanford.edu/STLR/Articles/06_STLR_6/Bains-Search%20Engine.pdf">The Search Engine Economy's Achilles Heel? Addressing Online Parallel Imports Resulting from Keyword and Metatag Misuse</a>, by Manavinder S. Bains. ]]>
   </content>
</entry>
<entry>
   <title>New Insights on the &quot;Death&quot; of Obviousness: An Empirical Study of District Court Obviousness Opinions</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://stlr.stanford.edu/2006/07/new_insights_on_the_death_of_o.html" />
   <id>tag:www.stanford.edu,2006:/group/stlr/blog//1.2</id>
   
   <published>2006-07-06T19:07:10Z</published>
   <updated>2007-10-27T07:33:14Z</updated>
   
   <summary>This Note presents an empirical study of district court opinions that reached the question of obviousness--one of the core requirements for patent validity--n patent suits. The doctrine of obviousness has befuddled courts and litigants since the Supreme Court&apos;s 1851 statement...</summary>
   <author>
      <name>Henry Lien</name>
      
   </author>
         <category term="Student Notes" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
   
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://stlr.stanford.edu/">
      This Note presents an empirical study of district court opinions that reached the question of obviousness--one of the core requirements for patent validity--n patent suits. The doctrine of obviousness has befuddled courts and litigants since the Supreme Court&apos;s 1851 statement that patentable invention requires some nebulous level of ingenuity and skill. By the 1970s, frustration with the obviousness doctrine had reached fever pitch, and Congress responded by centralizing patent appeals in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
      Empirical analyses of obviousness and other patent validity doctrines in the federal court system have generally found that patents are invalidated less often since the Federal Circuit&apos;s inception in 1982. These findings have led some scholars to conclude that the Federal Circuit has exerted a strong pro-patent bias in the federal court system and effectively lowered the hurdles of patentability. However, previous studies of obviousness have largely failed to directly compare cases from the pre- and post-Federal Circuit time periods or to consider district courts&apos; use of the obviousness doctrine.

This Note attempts to fill this void in the study of obviousness by comparing all published district court opinions reaching the question of obviousness for two time periods: 1970 through 1975, and 1995 through 2000. This study finds that, consistent with the notion of a pro-patent bias under the Federal Circuit&apos;s reign, district courts invalidated patents as obvious far less frequently in the 1990s than in the 1970s. However, this Note proposes that the explanation for this decreasing rate of obviousness is less clear than simply a pro-patent bias in the Federal Circuit.
   </content>
</entry>
<entry>
   <title>The Immorality of Theft, the Amorality of Infringement</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://stlr.stanford.edu/2006/07/the_immorality_of_theft_the_am.html" />
   <id>tag:www.stanford.edu,2006:/group/stlr/blog//1.1</id>
   
   <published>2006-07-01T18:30:27Z</published>
   <updated>2006-12-06T23:09:55Z</updated>
   
   <summary>Morality, an individual&apos;s subjective sense of right and wrong, is the biggest influence in shaping law-related behavior. And not surprisingly, both psychologists and legal theorists have begun to explore the links between personal morality and large-scale copyright infringement. But to...</summary>
   <author>
      <name>Henry Lien</name>
      
   </author>
         <category term="Student Notes" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
   
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://stlr.stanford.edu/">
      Morality, an individual&apos;s subjective sense of right and wrong, is the biggest influence in shaping law-related behavior. And not surprisingly, both psychologists and legal theorists have begun to explore the links between personal morality and large-scale copyright infringement. But to date, this analysis has not rigorously answered some basic questions. Why do people believe that theft is immoral? And why do so many differentiate theft from infringement?
      <![CDATA[This Note attempts to answer these questions by exploring and applying recent scholarship into the neuroscience of moral decision-making. In doing so, this Note sets forth a hypothesis about our innate intuitions of property and how these intuitions may affect our moral decisions regarding intellectual property, such as copyright. In developing this analysis, I first present a brief overview of the law and legal response to file sharing, illustrating how copyright owners' response, based on copyright law, has been unable to stop the rampant and widespread infringement of copyrighted works on the Internet. Second, I review the emerging Hybrid Theory of Moral Cognition. Using this theoretical framework, I set forth the Innate Property Intuition Hypothesis, a hypothesis that suggests humans share an innate and intuitive understanding of property and ownership, inherited as a result of evolution. Using this hypothesis, I explain why and how so many Internet users are able to morally distinguish infringement from theft. Finally, I speculate as to what, if anything, the copyright industries can do in light of our innate moral intuitions.

STLR is proud to present: <a href="http://stlr.stanford.edu/STLR/Articles/06_STLR_5/Manesh-immorality.pdf">The Immorality of Theft, the Amorality of Infringement</a>, a Note by Mohsen Manesh. ]]>
   </content>
</entry>
<entry>
   <title>Interpreting Grokster: Limits on the Scope of Secondary Liability for Copyright Infringement</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://stlr.stanford.edu/2006/06/interpreting_grokster_limits_o.html" />
   <id>tag:www.stanford.edu,2006:/group/stlr/blog//1.3</id>
   
   <published>2006-06-06T00:00:00Z</published>
   <updated>2006-12-06T23:15:55Z</updated>
   
   <summary>One year ago, on June 27, 2005, the Supreme Court released its much-anticipated ruling in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd . The unanimous decision held that Grokster and StreamCast, the distributors of popular peer-to-peer &quot;file sharing&quot; software, could be...</summary>
   <author>
      <name>Henry Lien</name>
      
   </author>
         <category term="Perspectives" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
   
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://stlr.stanford.edu/">
      <![CDATA[One year ago, on June 27, 2005, the Supreme Court released its much-anticipated ruling in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd . The unanimous decision held that Grokster and StreamCast, the distributors of popular peer-to-peer "file sharing" software, could be held secondarily liable for copyright infringement committed by their users if Grokster and StreamCast took active steps to induce infringement. This document outlines the limits on the scope of secondary copyright liability that follow from a close reading of the Grokster decision together with the landmark decision in Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. (1984), and patent law precedents relating to inducement liability. The Center for Democracy and Technology believes the legal principles set forth in this article represent the best reading of current law in the wake of Grokster and that careful observance of these principles by lower courts would serve the Grokster Court's goal of ensuring that secondary liability for copyright infringement "does nothing to compromise legitimate commerce or discourage innovation having lawful promise."

STLR is proud to present: <a href="http://stlr.stanford.edu/STLR/Perspectives/06_STLR_3/CDT-grokster.pdf">Interpreting Grokster: Limits on the Scope of Secondary Liability for Copyright Infringement</a>, a perspective by the Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT).]]>
      
   </content>
</entry>
<entry>
   <title>Deference Overcome: Courts&apos; Invalidation of Patent Claims as Anticipated by Art Considered by the PTO</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://stlr.stanford.edu/2006/04/deference_overcome_courts_inva.html" />
   <id>tag:www.stanford.edu,2006:/group/stlr/blog//1.4</id>
   
   <published>2006-04-06T17:43:20Z</published>
   <updated>2006-12-06T23:23:52Z</updated>
   
   <summary>This paper examines six decisions in which district courts have held patent claims invalid based on PTO-considered art. Part II describes the origin and limitations of the methodology used to select and analyze particular cases. Part III summarizes the pertinent...</summary>
   <author>
      <name>Henry Lien</name>
      
   </author>
         <category term="Feature Articles" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
   
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://stlr.stanford.edu/">
      <![CDATA[This paper examines six decisions in which district courts have held patent claims invalid based on PTO-considered art. Part II describes the origin and limitations of the methodology used to select and analyze particular cases. Part III summarizes the pertinent law relating to the presumption of validity and anticipation, and it briefly considers the PTO's inter partes patent reexamination process as an administrative analog of patent validity litigation. It ends with a summary of the factors weighing for and against the challenger. Part IV explores a few policy reasons that challengers should not be discouraged from relying on PTO-considered art, including the limited inquiry of patent examination, the PTO's admission that it issues invalid claims, and the economic efficiency of relying on PTO-considered art to invalidate patent claims. In Part V, the cases are described in terms of how the courts analyzed the issue of anticipation and how they addressed, if at all, the issue of deference to the PTO. Finally, conclusions and opportunities for further research are presented in Part VI.

STLR is proud to present: <a href="http://stlr.stanford.edu/STLR/Articles/06_STLR_2/BuchananJ-Deference.pdf">Deference Overcome: Courts' Invalidation of Patent Claims as Anticipated by Art Considered by the PTO</a> by J. Michael Buchanan. ]]>
      
   </content>
</entry>
<entry>
   <title>No Analog Analogue: Searchable Digital Archives and Amazon&apos;s Unprecedented Search Inside the Book Program as Fair Use</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://stlr.stanford.edu/2006/02/no_analog_analogue_searchable.html" />
   <id>tag:www.stanford.edu,2006:/group/stlr/blog//1.5</id>
   
   <published>2006-02-06T17:45:05Z</published>
   <updated>2007-08-20T09:32:55Z</updated>
   
   <summary> This paper begins with an overview of Amazon&apos;s prior experiments with e-books, the way in which the Search Inside the Book database is created, and how that database manifests itself to the Amazon user. Part II analyzes the Search...</summary>
   <author>
      <name>Henry Lien</name>
      
   </author>
         <category term="Student Notes" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
   
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://stlr.stanford.edu/">
      <![CDATA[ This paper begins with an overview of Amazon's prior experiments with e-books, the way in which the Search Inside the Book database is created, and how that database manifests itself to the Amazon user. Part II analyzes the Search Inside the Book program under current copyright law and concludes that the program does infringe copyrights in the indexed works. Part III argues that programs like Search Inside the Book, though infringing, actually serve the purposes of copyright law, and should not create liability for the providers of such programs. Finally, part IV applies the fair use doctrine to Search Inside the Book, assuming that the existing copy-protection measures are improved as indicated and ultimately finding this unconventional program protected as fair use.

STLR is proud to present: <a href="http://stlr.stanford.edu/STLR/Articles/06_STLR_1/KT-fair%20use.pdf">No Analog Analogue: Searchable Digital Archives and Amazon's Unprecedented Search Inside the Book Program as Fair Use</a> by Jonathan Kerry-Tyerman. ]]>
      
   </content>
</entry>
<entry>
   <title>Managing Risk to Reputation: The Challenge of the Internet for Legal Recruiting</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://stlr.stanford.edu/2005/09/managing_risk_to_reputation_th.html" />
   <id>tag:www.stanford.edu,2005:/group/stlr/blog//1.8</id>
   
   <published>2005-09-20T20:44:15Z</published>
   <updated>2006-12-08T06:47:13Z</updated>
   
   <summary>This article argues that corporate law firms do not appreciate the changing world of legal recruiting. The rise of information technology means that law students function as sophisticated consumers of information on law firm life. Given that monetary compensation at...</summary>
   <author>
      <name>Henry Lien</name>
      
   </author>
         <category term="Feature Articles" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
   
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://stlr.stanford.edu/">
      This article argues that corporate law firms do not appreciate the changing world of legal recruiting. The rise of information technology means that law students function as sophisticated consumers of information on law firm life. Given that monetary compensation at major corporate firms is almost identical, students&apos; perception of lifestyle can have a major influence on their valuation of firms. Consequently, firms need to adapt by more carefully managing the type of information that might be accessible to students, and their general reputation within the student community.

      <![CDATA[STLR is proud to present: <a href="http://stlr.stanford.edu/STLR/Articles/05_STLR_2/Skibell-ManagingRisk-pdf.pdf">Managing Risk to Reputation: The Challenge of the Internet for Legal Recruiting</a> by T. Colpan and L.R. Skibell. ]]>
   </content>
</entry>

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